We investigate the computational complexity of the discrete logarithm, the computational Diffie-Hellman and the decisional Diffie-Hellman problems in some identity black-box groups G p,t , where p is a prime number and t is a positive integer. These are defined as quotient groups of vector space Z t+1 p by a hyperplane H given through an identity oracle. While in general black-box groups with unique encoding these computational problems are classically all hard and quantumly all easy, we find that in the groups G p,t the situation is more contrasted. We prove that while there is a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm to solve the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in G p,1 , the probabilistic query complexity of all the other problems is Ω(p), and their quantum query complexity is Ω( √ p). Our results therefore provide a new example of a group where the computational and the decisional Diffie-Hellman problems have widely different complexity.
Introduction
Black-box groups we introduced by Babai and Szemerédi [5] for studying the structure of finite matrix groups. In a black-box group, the group elements are encoded by binary strings of certain length, the multiplication and inverse group operations are given by oracles. Similarly, identity testing, that is checking whether an element is equal to the identity element, is also done with a special identity oracle. These oracles are also called black-boxes, giving their names to the groups. Identity testing is required when several strings may encode the same group element. In this case we speak about non-unique encoding, in opposition to unique encoding when every group element is encoded by a unique string. Black-box groups with non-unique encoding are motivated by their ability to capture factor groups of subgroups of matrix groups by certain normal subgroups which admit efficient algorithms for membership testing. An important example for such a subgroup is the solvable radical, that is the largest solvable normal subgroup.
A black-box group problem might only have the oracle inputs if the problem concerns some global property of the group. In some other cases it might also have standard inputs (or shortly inputs), a finite set of group elements represented by their encodings. A black-box group algorithm is allowed to call the oracles for the group operations and for the identity test and it might also perform arbitrary bit operations. The query complexity of an algorithm is the number of oracle calls, while the running time or computational complexity is the number of oracle calls together with the number of other bit operations, when we are maximizing over both oracle and standard inputs. In the quantum setting, the oracles are given by unitary operators.
Many classical algorithms have been developped for computations with black-box groups [6, 4, 14] , for example the identification of the composition factors, even the non-commutative ones. When the oracle operations can be simulated by efficient procedures, efficient black-box algorithms automatically produce efficient algorithms. Permutation groups, finite matrix groups over finite fields and over algebraic number fields fit in this context. There has been also considerable effort to design quantum algorithms in black-box groups. In the case of unique encoding efficient algorithms have been conceived for the decomposition of Abelian groups into a direct sum of cyclic groups of prime power order [9] , order computing and membership testing in solvable groups [22] and solving the hidden subgroup problem in Abelian groups [17] .
The discrete logarithm problem DLOG, and various Diffie-Hellman type problems are fundamental tasks in computational number theory. They are equally important in cryptography, since the security of many cryptographic systems is based on their computational difficulty. Let G be a cyclic group (denoted additively). Given two group elements g and h, where g is a generator, DLOG asks to compute an integer d such that h = dg. Given three group elements g, ag and bg, where g is a generator, the computational Diffie-Hellman problem CDH is to compute (ab)g. Given three group elements g, ag, bg and cg, where g is a generator, the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem DDH is to decide whether c = ab modulo the order of g.
The problems are enumerated in decreasing order of difficulty: DDH can not be harder than CDH and CDH is not harder than DLOG. While there are groups where even DLOG is easy (for example Z m , the additive group of integers modulo m), in general all three problems are thought to be computationally hard. We are not aware of any group where CDH is easy while DLOG is hard. In fact, Maurer and Wolf have proven in [16] that under a seemingly reasonable number-theoretic assumption, the two problems are equivalent in the case of unique-encoding groups. Based on this, Joux and Nguyen [13] have constructed a cryptographic group where DDH is easy to compute while CDH is as hard as DLOG. In generic black-box groups we have provable query lower bounds for these problems, even in the case of unique encoding. Shoup has proven [21] that in Z p , given as a black-box group with unique encoding, to solve DLOG and CDH require Ω(p 1/2 ) group operations. Subsequently, Damgård, Hazay and Zottare [10] have established a lower bound of the same order for DDH. We remark that the Pohlig-Hellman [18] algorithm reduces DLOG in arbitrary cyclic groups to DLOG in its prime order subgroups. Furthermore, in prime order groups (with unique encodings), Shanks's baby-step giant-step algorithm solve the problem using O(p 1/2 ) group operation, thus matching the lower bound for black-box groups.
Though, as we said, all three problems are considered computationally intractable on a classical computer, there is a polynomial time quantum algorithm for DLOG due to Shor [20] . Since DLOG is an instance of the Abelian hidden subgroup problem, Mosca's result [17] implies that by a quantum computer it can also be solved efficiently in black-box groups with unique encoding.
We are concerned here with identity black-box group, a special class of black-box groups where only the identity test is given by an oracle. These groups are quotient groups of some explicitly given ambient group. An identity black box group G is specified by an ambient group G ′ and an identity oracle Id which tests membership in some (unknown) normal subgroup H of G ′ . In G the group operations are explicitly defined by the group operations in G ′ , and therefore it is the quotient group G ′ /H.
Let p be a prime number. More specifically we will study the problems DLOG, CDH and DDH in identity black-box groups whose ambient group is Z t+1 p , for some positive integer t, and where the normal subgroup H, specified by the identity oracle, is isomorphic to Z t p . We denote such an identity black box group by G p,t . We fully characterize the complexity of the three problems in these groups. Our results are mainly query lower bounds: the probabilistic query complexity of all these problems, except DDH in level 1 groups, is Ω(p), and their quantum query complexity is Ω( √ p). These lower bounds are obviously tight since DLOG(G p,t ) can be solved, for all t ≥ 1, by exhaustive search and by Grover's algorithm in respective query complexity p and O( √ p). We have also one, maybe surprising, algorithmic result: the computational complexity of DDH(G p,1 ) is polynomial. Our results can be summarized in the following theorems.
Theorem (Lower bounds)
1. For all t ≥ 1, the randomized query complexity of DLOG(G p,t ) and CDH(G p,1 ) is Ω(p).
2. For all t ≥ 1, the quantum query complexity of DLOG(G p,t ) and CDH(G p,1 ) is Ω( √ p).
3. For all t ≥ 2, the randomized query complexity of DDH(G p,t ) is Ω(p).
4. For all t ≥ 2, the quantum query complexity of DDH(G p,t ) is Ω( √ p).
Theorem (Upper bound) DDH(G p,1 ) can be solved in probabilistic polynomial time in log p.
Preliminaries
Formally, a black-box group G is a 4-tuple G = (C, Mult, Inv, Id) where C is the set of admissible codewords, Mult : C × C → C is a binary operation, Inv : C → C is a unary operation and Id : C → {0, 1} is a unary Boolean function. The operations Mult, Inv and the function Id are given by oracles. We require that there exists a finite group G and a surjective map φ : C → G for which, for every x, y ∈ C, we have φ(Mult(x, y)) = φ(x)φ(y), φ(Inv(x)) = φ(x) −1 , and φ(x) = 1 G if and only if Id(x) = 1. We say that x is the identity element in G or that x = 1 if Id(x) = 1. With the identity oracle we can test equality since x = y in G exactly when Id(Mult(x, Inv(y))) = 1. We say that a black-box group has unique encoding if φ is a bijection. For abelian groups we also use the additive notation in which case the binary operation of G is denoted by Add and its identity element is denoted by 0. We are concerned here with a special class of black-box groups which are quotient groups of some explicitly given group. An identity black-box group is a couple G = (G ′ , Id) where G ′ is group and the identity oracle Id : G ′ → {0, 1} is the characteristic function of some (unknown) normal subgroup H of G ′ . We call G ′ the ambient group of G. In G the group operations Mult and Inv are defined by the group operations in the ambient group G ′ modulo H. As a consequence, G is the quotient group G ′ /H.
Let p be a prime number and let t ≥ 1 be a positive integer. We denote by Z p the additive group of integers modulo p, by F p the finite field of size p, and by Z t p the t-dimensional vector space over F p . For h, k ∈ Z t p , we denote their scalar product modulo p by h · k.
We will work with identity black-box groups whose ambient group is Z t+1 p , and the subgroup H is isomorphic to Z t p , that is a hyperplane of Z t+1 p . We will specify the identity oracle by a nonzero normal vector n ∈ Z t+1 p of H. By permuting coordinates and multiplying by some non-zero constant, we can suppose without loss of generality that it is of the form n = (1, n 1 , . . . , n t ). We call such a vector t-suitable. We define the function Id n : Z t+1 p → {0, 1} by Id n (h) = 1 if h · n = 0. Clearly Id n is the characteristic function of the hyperplane H n = {h ∈ Z t+1 p : h · n = 0}. We define the identity black-box group G p,t = (Z t+1 p , Id), where the identity oracle Id satisfies Id = Id n , for some (unknown) t-suitable vector n. We call t the level of the group G p,t . We emphasize again that the group operations of G p,t are performed as group operations in Z t+1 p . Therefore, for h, k ∈ Z t+1 p , the equality h = k in G p,t means equality in Z t+1 p modulo H n , where H n is identified by Id n . To be short, we will refer to G p,t as the hidden cyclic group of level t.
Proposition 2.1. The groups G p,t, and Z p are isomorphic and the map φ :
Proof. The maps from Z t+1 p to G p,t (respectively to Z p ) mapping h ∈ Z t+1 p to its class in the quotient G p,t (respectively to h · n) are group homomorphisms with the same kernel H n .
We recall now the basic notions of query complexity for the specific case of boolean oracle functions. Let m be a positive integer. An oracle function is a function A : S → {0, 1} M , where S ⊆ {0, 1} m and M ≥ 1 is a positive integer. If M = 1, then we call the oracle function boolean. The input f ∈ S is given by an oracle, that is f (x) can be accessed by the query x. The output on f is A(f ). Each query adds one to the complexity of an algorithm, but all other computations are free. The state of the computation is represented by three registers, the query register 1 ≤ x ≤ m, the answer register a ∈ {0, 1}, and the work register z. The computation takes place in the vector space spanned by all basis states |x |a |z . In the quantum query model introduced by Beals et al. [7] the state of the computation is a complex combination of all basis states which has unit length in the norm l 2 . In the randomized query model it is a non-negative real combination of unit length in the norm l 1 , and in the deterministic model it is always one of the basis states.
The query operation O f maps the basis state |x |a |z into the state |x |(a + f (x)) mod 2 |z . Non-query operations do not depend on f . A k-query algorithm is a sequence of (k + 1) operations (U 0 , U 1 , . . . , U k ) where U i is unitary in the quantum, and stochastic in the randomized model. Initially the state of the computation is set to some fixed value |0 |0 |0 , and then the sequence
A quantum or randomized algorithm computes A on input f if the observation of the last M bits of the work register yields A(f ) with probability at least 2/3. Then Q(A) (respectively R(A)) is the smallest k for which there exists a k-query quantum (respectively randomized) algorithm which computes A on every input f . We
We define now our problems we are concerened with, the discrete logarithm problem DLOG, the computational Diffie-Hellman problem CDH and the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem DDH in hidden cyclic groups G p,t . We say that a quadruple (g, h, k, ℓ) ∈ G 4 p,t where g is a generator of G p,t is a DH-quadruple if h = ag, k = bg and ℓ = cg for some integers a, b, c such that c = ab modulo p.
DLOG(G p,t )
Oracle input: Id n for some t-suitable vector n. Input: A couple (g, h) ∈ G 2 p,t such that g is a generator of G p,t . Output: A non-negative integer d such that dg = h.
CDH(G p,t )
Oracle input: Id n for some t-suitable vector n.
p,t such that g is a generator of G p,t . Question: Is (g, h, k, ℓ) a DH-quadruple?
An algorithm for these problems has access to the input and oracle access to the oracle input, and every query is counted as one computational step. We say that it solves the problem efficiently if it works in time polynomial in log p and t. For any fixed input, the problems become oracle functions, where we consider only those identity oracles for which the input is legitimate. By their query complexity we mean, both in the quantum and in the randomized model, the maximum, over all inputs, of the respective query complexity of these oracle function.
The problems are enumerated in decreasing order of difficulty. The existence of an efficient algorithm for DLOG(G p,t ) implies the existence of an efficient algorithm for CDH(G p,t ), which in turn gives rise to an efficient algorithm for DDH(G p,t ). For query complexity we have Q(DDH(G p,t )) ≤ Q(CDH(G p,t )) ≤ Q(DLOG(G p,t )), and the same inequalities hold for the randomized model. The problems are getting harder as the level of the hidden cyclic group increases, as the almost trivial reductions in the next Proposition show. To ease notation, for h = (h 0 , . . . , h t ) in Z t+1 p , we denote by h ′ the element (h 0 , . . . , h t , 0) ∈ Z t+2 p . Proposition 2.2. For every t ≥ 1, DLOG(G p,t ) and DDH(G p,t ) are polynomial time manyone reducible to respectively DLOG(G p,t+1 ) and DDH(G p,t+1 ); and CDH(G p,t ) is computable in polynomial time with a single query to CDH(G p,t+1 ).
Proof. First observe that the identity oracle Id n ′ in G p,t+1 can be simulated by the identity oracle Id n of G p,t . Indeed, for an arbitrary element h * in G p,t+1 , where h * = (h 0 , h 1 , . . . , h t , h t+1 ), set h = (h 0 , h 1 , . . . , h t ). Then h * · n ′ = h · n. Let g be a generator of G p,t with identity oracle Id n , that is g · n = 0. Then g ′ = (g, 0) is a generator of G p,t+1 with identity oracle Id n ′ , since g ′ · n ′ = g · n, and therefore g ′ · n ′ = 0.
For arbitrary h, k, ℓ ∈ G p,t , and for every integer d, we have dg = h if and only if dg ′ = h ′ . Similarly, (g, h, k, ℓ) is a DH-quadruple if and only if (g ′ , h ′ , k ′ , ℓ ′ ) is a DH-quadruple. This gives the many-one reductions for DLOG and DDH. In the CDH reduction, on an instance (g, h, k), we call CDH(G p,t+1 ) on instance (g ′ , h ′ , k ′ ). Suppose that it gives the answer ℓ * = (ℓ 0 , ℓ 1 , . . . , ℓ t , ℓ t+1 ). We set ℓ = (ℓ 0 , ℓ 1 , . . . , ℓ t ), and observe that (g, h, k, ℓ) is a DH-quadruple because (g ′ , h ′ , k ′ , ℓ * ) is a DH-quadruple and ℓ * · n ′ = ℓ · n.
The complexity in groups of level 1
In most parts of this section we restrict ourselves to the case t = 1. To simplify notation, we set n = (1, s) and we denote the identity oracle Id n by Id s and the line H n by H s . Also, we refer to s as the secret. As it turns out, solving DLOG(G p,1 ) or CDH(G p,1 ) is essentially as hard as finding the secret, therefore we define formally this problem as
What is the complexity of finding s, that is how many calls to the identity oracle are needed for that task? To answer this question, we consider US, the well studied unstructured search problem. Suppose that the size of C is N . It is easily seen that probabilistic query complexity of US(C) is linear in N . The quantum query complexity of the problem is also well studied. Grover [11] has determined that it can be solved with O( √ N ) queries, while Bennett at al. [8] have shown that Ω( √ N ) queries are also necessary. The relationship between US and the problem SECRET is given by the fact that the identity oracle Id s and the Grover oracle ∆ s can simulate each other with a single query. Corollary 3.3. The randomized query complexity of SECRET(G p,1 ) is Θ(p) and its quantum query complexity is Θ( √ p).
We will now consider the reductions of SECRET(G p,1 ) to DLOG(G p,1 ) and CDH(G p,1 ). The case of DLOG(G p,1 ) in fact follows from the case of CDH(G p,1 ), but it is so simple that it is worth to describe it explicitely.
Lemma 3.4. The secret s in G p,1 can be found with a single oracle call to DLOG(G p,1 )
Proof. First observe that (1, 0) is a generator of G p,1 , for every s. The algorithm calls DLOG(G p,1 ) on input (g, h) = ((1, 0), (0, 1) ). Since φ(g) = 1 and φ(h) = s, the oracle's answer is the secret s itself.
We remark that with overwhelming probability we could have given also a random couple (g, h) ∈ G 2 p,1 to the oracle, where g is a generator. Indeed, let's suppose that d is the discrete logarithm. Then h − dg ∈ H s , and therefore s = −(h 0 − dg 0 )(h 1 − dg 1 ) −1 , where the operations are done in Z p , under the condition that h 1 − dg 1 = 0, which happens with probability (p − 1)/p.
The reduction of SECRET(G p,1 ) to CDH(G p,1 ) requires more work. The main idea of the reduction is to extend Z p to a field and use the multiplication for the characterization of DHquadruples. Indeed, since Z p is the additive group of the field F p , we can use the isomorphism φ of Proposition 2.1 between G p,t and Z p to define appropriate multiplication and multiplicative inverse operations. This extends G p,t to a field isomorphic to F p which we denote by F p,t . This process is completely standard but we describe it for completeness. The definitions of these two operations are:
With these operations the map φ becomes a field isomorphism between F p,t and F p . The field structure of F p,t yields a very useful characterization of DH-quadruples. Proposition 3.6. Let g be a generator of G p,t . In F p,t the quadruple (g, h, k, ℓ) is a DH-quadruple if and only if gℓ − hk = 0.
Proof. Let h = ag, k = bg and ℓ = cg for some integers a, b, c. Using the field structure of F p,t , it is true that gℓ − hk = 0 if and only if (c − ab)g 2 = 0. Since F p,t is isomorphic to F p , an element g is a generator of the additive group Z p exactly when g = 0, and therefore when g 2 is a generator. Therefore (c − ab)g 2 = 0 if an only if c = ab.
We define the application χ : Z t+1
Observe that p h (n 1 , . . . n t ) = h · n, therefore the isomorphism φ between G p,t with identity oracle Id n and Z p can be also expressed as φ(h) = p h (n 1 , . . . n t ).
Proposition 3.7. Let g be a generator of G p,1 and let h, k, ℓ be arbitrary elements. Then (g, h, k, ℓ) is a DH-quadruple if and only if s is a root of the polynomial p g (x)p ℓ (x) − p h (x)p k (x).
Proof. By Proposition 3.6 we know that (g, h, k, ℓ) is a DH-quadruple if and only if gℓ − hk = 0, that is when p gℓ−hk (s) = 0. Now Proposition 3.5 implies that this happens exactly when p g (s)p ℓ (s) − p h (s)p k (s) = 0. Lemma 3.8. There is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which, given oracle access to CDH(G p,1 ), solves SECRET(G p,1 ). The algorithm asks a single query to CDH(G p,1 ). If we are also given a quadratic non-residue in Z p , the algorithm can be made deterministic.
Proof. The algorithm sets g = (1, 0), h = (0, 1), k = (1, 1) and presents it to the oracle. Let the oracle's answer be ℓ = (ℓ 0 , ℓ 1 ). Since (g, h, k, ℓ) is a DH-quadruple, by Proposition 3.7 we have that s is the root of the second degree equation
Assuming that a quadratic non-residue in Z p is available then the (not necessarily distinct) roots x 1 , x 2 can be computed in deterministic polynomial time using the Shanks-Tonelli algorithm [19] . Without this assumption, a quadratic non-residue can always be computed in probabilistic polynomial time. Finally, we make at most two calls to Id s on (x 1 , −1) and on (x 2 , −1). The positive answer tells us which one of the roots is the secret s.
Similarly to the DLOG case, we could have presented with overwhelming probability also a random triple (g, h, k) ∈ G 3 p,s to CDH(G p,1 ), where g is a generator. Indeed, if the oracle answer is ℓ = (ℓ 0 , ℓ 1 ) then s is a root of the at most second degree equation
If the equation is of degree 2 then we can proceed as in the proof of Lemma 3.8. This happens exactly when h 1 k 1 = g 1 ℓ 1 . But for every possible fixed value a for g 1 ℓ 1 , the probability, over random h 1 and k 1 , that h 1 k 1 = a is at most 2/p, the worst case being a = 0. Therefore a random triple (g, h, k) would be suitable for the proof with probability at least (p − 2)/p. Theorem 3.9. The following lower bounds hold for the query complexity of DLOG and CDH:
(1) The classical query complexity of both DLOG(G p,s ) and CDH(G p,s ) is Ω(p).
(2) The quantum query complexity of both DLOG(G p,s ) and CDH(G p,s ) is Ω( √ p).
Proof. Let us suppose that with m queries to the identity oracle Id s , one can solve DLOG(G p,1 ) or CDH(G p,1 ). Respectively Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.8 imply that SECRET(G p,1 ) can be solved with m queries. The result then follows from the lower bounds of Corollary 3.3.
Theorem 3.10. The DDH(G p,1 ) problem can be solved in probabilistic polynomial time. If we are given a quadratic non-residue in Z p the algorithm can be made deterministic.
Proof. Let (g, h, k, ℓ) be an input to DDH(G p,1 ) where g is a generator of G p,1 . By Proposition 3.7 it is a DH-quadruple if and only if s is a root of the polynomial p g (x)p ℓ (x) − p h (x)p k (x), and that is what the algorithm checks. When the polynomial is constant, then the answer is yes if the constant is zero, and otherwise it is no. When the polynomial is non constant, the algorithm essentially proceeds as the one in Lemma 3.8. It solves the at most second degree equation and then checks with the identity oracle if one root is equal to s.
The complexity of DDH in groups of level 2
There are several powerful means to prove quantum query lower bounds, most notably the adversary and the polynomial method [7] . The quantum adversary method initiated by Ambainis [2] has been extended in several ways. The most powerful of those, the method using negative weights [12] , turned out to be an exact characterization of the quantum query complexity [15] . We use here a special case of the positive weighted adversary method that also gives probabilistic lower bounds. Let Γ be an arbitrary S × S nonnegative symmetric matrix that satisfies Γ[f, g] = 0 whenever
Then
Theorem 4.2. The following lower bounds hold for the query complexity of DDH in level 2 hidden cyclic groups: Q(DDH(G p,2 )) = Ω( √ p) and R(DDH(G p,2 )) = Ω(p).
Proof. Let i = ((1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)). Observe that the element (1, 0, 0) is a generator of G p,2 , for any 2-suitable vector n = (1, n 1 , n 2 ). By Proposition 3.6, we know that i is a DHquadruple if and only if n 1 + n 2 = n 1 n 2 . We say that n is positive if this equality holds, otherwise we say that it is negative. Let m = p 3 and let S = {Id n : n ∈ Z 2 p }. We will apply Fact 4.1 to the boolean oracle function DDH defined in G p,2 on input i with the oracle input being the identity oracle Id n : Z 3 p → {0, 1}. For simplicity we will refer to this boolean oracle function just by DDH(n). We define the symmetric p 2 × p 2 boolean adversary matrix Γ as follows:
where again Γ[n, n ′ ] is a shorthand notation for Γ[Id n , Id n ′ ]. We first determine σ(Γ, n). If n 1 = 1 then there is no n 2 such that n 1 + n 2 = n 1 n 2 . Otherwise, for every fixed n 1 = 1, there is a unique n 2 that makes this equality hold, in particular n 2 = n 1 (n 1 − 1) −1 . Therefore the number of positive n is p − 1 and the number of negative n is p 2 − p + 1. Thus we have the following values for σ(Γ, n):
Let us recall, that by definition, for every h ∈ G p,2 , Γ h [n, n ′ ] = 1 if DDH(n) = DDH(n ′ ) and Id n (h) = Id n ′ (h), 0 otherwise.
We fix now n and n ′ such that DDH(n) = DDH(n ′ ), we will suppose without loss of generality that n is positive and n ′ is negative. We also fix h = (h 0 , h 1 , h 2 ) in Z 3 p such that Id n (h) = Id n ′ (h). This implies that (h 1 , h 2 ) = (0, 0). We want to lower bound σ(Γ, n)/σ(Γ h , n) and σ(Γ, n ′ )/σ(Γ h , n ′ ). Obviously both fractions are at least 1. We distinguish two cases according to whether Id n (h) = 0 or Id n ′ (h) = 0.
Case 1: Id n ′ (h) = 0. Then σ(Γ h , n ′ ) = (m 1 , m 2 ) ∈ Z 2 p : m 1 + m 2 = m 1 m 2 and h 0 + h 1 m 1 + h 2 m 2 = 0 .
We claim that the cardinality at the right hand side is at most 2. We know already that m 1 = 1 and m 2 = m 1 (m 1 − 1) −1 . Therefore m 1 satisfies the second degree equation
The number of roots of this equation is at most 2, unless the polynomial is 0. But this can not be the case, because then h 1 = h 2 = 0, a contradiction. Therefore, taking into account (1), we have σ(Γ, n ′ ) σ(Γ h , n ′ ) = Ω p 1 = Ω(p).
Case 2: Id n (h) = 0. Then σ(Γ h , n) = |{(m 1 , m 2 ) ∈ Z 2 p : h 0 + h 1 m 1 + h 2 m 2 = 0}|. Since (h 1 , h 2 ) = (0, 0), the number of roots of this linear equation with two variables is p. Therefore, again taking into account (1), we have σ(Γ, n) σ(Γ h , n)
= Ω p 2 p = Ω(p).
The statements of the theorem immediately follow from equations (2) and (3).
Similarly to the remarks after Lemmas 3.4 and 3.8, we could have used in the proof instead of i a random input (g, h, k, ℓ), with high probability. Indeed, let us suppose that we fix any u = (u 0 , u 1 , u 2 ) in Z 3 p , with (u 1 , u 2 ) = (0, 0), to evaluate the properties of the matrix Γ u . If we can show that the number of solutions of the system of equations      (g 0 + g 1 x + g 2 y)(ℓ 0 + ℓ 1 x + ℓ 2 y) − (h 0 + h 1 x + h 2 y)(k 0 + k 1 x + k 2 y) = 0 u 0 + u 1 x + u 2 y = 0 is at most 2, then the same proof works. Without loss of generality we can suppose that u 2 = 0. We express y from the second equation as function of x and substitute it in the first equation. We claim that the second degree polynomial we get, in particular its constant member, is nonzero with probability at least (p − 2)/p. The value of the constant member besides u depends on g 0 , g 2 , ℓ 0 , ℓ 2 , h 0 , h 2 , k 0 , k 2 . We fix arbitrarily all these random variables except g 0 and ℓ 0 . Then, for some constants a, b, c ∈ Z p , we need to evaluate the probability of the event (g 0 + a)(ℓ 0 + b) = c, which is at least (p − 2)/p.
